LIENS OF THE RECEIVERSHIP OF A BUSINESS
CORPORATION.-PART II.
Turning now to the state courts, we shall find a great
divergence of decision. Some are quite as emphatic as the
Federal courts in refusing to permit the receiver to incur
indebtedness at the expense of the lien holders; others consider it a matter of right.
The matter was definitely settled in New York, as early as
1887, by the case of Raht v. 4&rill,1 an authority much relied
on by Caldwell, Cir. J., in Hanna v. State Trust Co.2 The
Rockaway Beach Hotel was undertaken by a corporation
which exhausted its means in the first six months, leaving the
hotel far from finished. Then a receiver was appointed, who
undertook to complete the work and operate the hotel with
money borrowed on certificates. At one time a mob of unpaid
and starving workmen became riotous and threatened to bum
the building, and the referee found that they would have done
so had not more money been advanced at. once to pay them.
Finally, a purchase money mortgage was foreclosed, and the
net result of an expenditure of $i,oooooo to improve the
property was a fund of about $86,ooo wherewith to pay
claims exceeding $8oo,aoo. The court said "this case illustrates what I apprehend has been the common experience,
where a court, departing from its appropriate judicial function,
has undertaken to manage and carry on the business of a
failing and insolvent corporation." The priority given the
certificates, although neither the mortgage trustee nor the
bondholders had been made parties to the proceedings, led to
a contest over the fund. The court went as far as seemed
possible towards allowing the debts of the receivership: "It
has become the settled rule that expenses of realization and
also certain expenses, which are called expenses of preservation, may be incurred under the order of the court on the
io6 N. Y. 423 (1887).
70 Fed. 2 (1895), (C. C. of A.)

LIENS OF THE NZMLVERSHIP

credit of the property; and it follows, from necessity, in order
to the effectual administration of the trust assumed by the
court, that these expenses should be paid out of the income,
or, when necessary, out of the corp s of the property before
distribution, or -before the court passes over the property to
those adjudged to be entitled. It is claimed that the money
advanced in this case to protect the property from an incendiary burning created a debt for preservation, which may be
preferred to the claim of the bondholders. We are of a contrary opinion." It was the duty of the state to suppress riot
and protect property, rather than of a receiver to buy his
peace. The conclusion is accordingly reached: "It would beunwise, we think, to extend the power of the court, in dealing
with property in the hands of receivers, to the practical subversion or destruction of vested interests, as would be the case
in this instance if the order of August r7th should be sustained.
It is best for all that the integrity of contracts should be
strictly guarded and maintained, and that a rigid rather than
a liberal construction of the power of the court to subject
property in the hands of receivers to charges, to the prejudice
of creditors, should be adopted."
The case of Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. v. Bankers & Merchants' Telegraph Company' deserves notice, for the business
continued by the receiver was that of an important telegraph
company. Priority over the mortgage bonds was sought by
a creditor for advances made to the company just before the
receivership. This, it will be remembered, involves an extension of the general principle invoked, that can be sanctioned only if the business is to be continued by the receiver,
to keep the corporation a going concern until its assets are
sold. The court went so far as to say: "There is a sound
equity which supports the doctrine that, when the nature
of the property is such that the -business to which it has
been devoted cannot be discontinued without great probable
loss, the court may authorize it to be continued by its
officer and receiver, pending the closing up of the affairs
of the insolvent corporation. Expenses incurred by a re148 N.Y. 315 (1896).
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ceiver under such circumstances may be justly said to be
expenses of preservation for the benefit of bondholders, or
other persons entitled to share in the final distribution,
The court examined the
which ought to be first paid."
circumstances attending these loans, and found there was no
equity demanding priority; accordingly this was refused,
for "the right of a creditor of an insolvent corporation in the
hands of a receiver to have a preference over bondholders
frir."
s's
under a first mortgage is
There seems to have been no direct decision on the subject in
Pennsylvania until this year,1 but two cases, just decided, merit
notice. In Gillespie v. Blair Glass Company, receivers were
given authority to operate the glass works "with materials
now on hand" and with such other materials as the court
might authorize them to buy. They went beyond the scope
of this order without asking permission .of-the court, and the
operation of the plant resulted in a deficit To make this
good, the receivers asserted a claim against the fund realized
by the sale of the plant, but the laborers had a statutory lien
on this fund. Under these circumstances the court awarded
the fund to the laborers, saying inter alia: "It is not neces-,
sary to inquire under what circumstances these receivers would
be protected from loss by the court, since the question is not
raised by the facts. . . . A chancellor will seek to protect one
acting in strict compliance with his orders from loss, but one
who has acted upon his own judgment has no right to expect
the court to divest a clear legal right existing in others to save
him from the consequences of his own unauthorized acts.
The receivers had a designated fund in this case to which to
look. When that fund was exhausted they knew it. If, instead of suspending the unprofitable operations, they chose to
continue them and incur a considerable indebtedness which
they knew they could not pay, their improper conduct gives
them no claim upon the chancellor or the creditors for reimbursement. They are in the same position as other improvident debtors. The proceeds of the realty were already
1

See, however, Lewis v. Linden Steel Co., x83 Pa. 248 (1897).
'l8g Pa. 50 (899).
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appropriated by the law to the laborers, and were beyond the
reach of the receivers."
This manifestly leaves the main question undecided, but- it
came up almost immediately afterwards in Law v. Washingtm
Hotel Comrany. The receiver of a hotel company continued
in possession of leased premises and operated the hotel under
the order of the court. The landlord's application for leave
to distrain for rent accruing during the receiver's possession
was refused by the court, but an equivalent lien on the fund
to be realized was given instead. The venture proved unprofitable, the personal property on the premises subject to
distraint did not bring enough to pay the rent, and part even
of this fund was claimed by the receiver to pay his commissions and counsel fee. The receiver had been appointed at
the instance of the company or of its creditors. The Supreme
Court disallowed these claims of the receiver, saying:
"Whether there can be any sound judicial reason for continuing the business of an insolvent hotel corporation, is, to say
the least, very doubtful. But, without regard to this point,
there is no power in the courts in the interests of creditors
and stockholders to take possession of property, operate it as
a hotel and deprive the owner of any legal right." The lien
given on the fund was approved, as the orderly method of
procedure in view of the receiver's possession, and it was
necessarily paramount to any of his claims. "He could have
no other or more favorable exemption from her demand than
his insolvent, the hotel company, had, nor could the court
give him any. He was not receiver for her estate, but for her
tenant; no insolvency of her tenant, nor action of the court
in the interest of the tenant's creditors, couli prejudice the
landlord's right to her rent, and this right continued as long
as the receiver occupied .her property under the terms of the
hotel company's lease. The receiver, except for this lease,
would have been an intruder upon her property, even though
acting by the assumed authority of the court." But the audit
of the account was necessary for the adjudication of the con1190 Pa.

230 (1899).
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flicting claims and it was right, therefore, that the landlord
should contribute to its costs.
The powers sometimes attributed to a court are illustrated
in a curious way by a recent case in Georgia.' The owner
of a gold mine, solvent so far as appears, sought to restrain
an alleged licencee from mining. The defendant thereupon
prayed for a receiver, and the court not only appointed one
but directed him to work the mine. The Supreme Court, on
appeal, held the appointment proper enough as regarded a
quantity of ore already mined, but commented severely on the
authority given the receiver: "The court seized this property,
directed the receiver to go into the mining business--confessedly one of the most hazardous in which any man can engage.
Suppose, as the result of his operation, he had demonstrated
that there was little gold .in the mine, except such as had
already been taken out, and fallen far short of realizing a
sufficient fund to defray the expenses of the business venture,
what would have been the position of the plaintiff, who, in the
first'instance, appealed to the court for his protection? His
mine would have been destroyed. He would have been liable
to be taxed the costs of the receivership, with the probability
of having the expense of this business experiment shared by
an' insolvent adversary.

. .

. Necessarily, these matters are

largely within the discretion of the trial judge, but at last it
becomes a' question of law whether the court can lawfully
embark property seized by it in an industrial enterprise, and
the exercise of this power depend upon how far such conduct
may be fairly necessary to the preservation of the existing
status, taking into consideration the character of the property,
the uses t6 which it may be applibd, anid how far, and to what
exterit, use niay be necessay to its preservation. So far as
we are enabled to do so by judicial' utterance, we are disposed
to dicourage the practice, at the pieesent day too prevalent in
tlie chancery courts, of undertaking to employ the judicial
machinery in the conduct of commiercial and manufacturing
enterprises,, the control of which" should' Be more properly
c6nmiftedi to private hands."
'Igbee v. Seymour28s. B. 642 (i897).
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The same conclusion was reached in Hooperv. CeitralTrust
Company.1 where it was sought to give piiority over a vendor's lien to certificates issued for funds used to improve the
property of an ice company. "It would be exceedingly dangerous," said the court, "to concede to a court of equity the
power to displace, in favor of receiver's certificates, subsisting
liens on the property of private corporations or of individuals." This decision was affirmed a year later in Diamoid
2
Matck Company v. Taylor.
Similarly, in Vance v. Shiawassee Circuit Judgt, the Supreme Court of Michigan modified the appointment of a receiver of a box manufacturing corporation, and set aside so
much of the decree as directed him to continue the business
pending the litigation 4
These are the chief authorities in the state courts deciding
the question in favor of the lien-holders. Opposed to them
are several in Illinois, Virginia, Alabama, Texas, and perhaps
some other states. Thus in Illinois there was recently'a case"
analogous to Lane v. Washington Hotel Co.' A receiver was
appointed for a hotel property, with instructions to operate it
and continue the business. This resulted in loss, for which a
credit was claimed out of the fund, in preference to a claim
for the proceeds of furniture left in the receiver's possession.
The owner, however, had assented to the use of his furniture,
and the court held he was estopped. The facts, therefore, did
not directly involve the power of the court to make the expenses of the receivership a charge superior to prior liens
owned by persons not parties to the suit. But the court went
on to discuss the question in general terms: "The object of
appointing a receiver is to preserve the property for the benefit
of all parties interested. Sometimes this object is best attained
e

8z Md. 559 (1895).

' 83 Md. 394 (xIg6).
*6oN.W. (Mich.) 76r (1894).
See, also, Bushworth v. Smith, 34 Pac. (Colo.) 482 (1893), and Manhattan Trust Co. v. Seattle Coal and Iron Co., 48 Pac. (Wash.) 333

(1897).
5Knickerbocker z,. McKindley Coal Co.,
a190 Pa. 230 (8Wg).

172 111.

535 (1898).
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by continuing a business. When this is done, the court has
the.right--although it should exercise such right with great
caution--to make the expenses of such business chargeable
upon the corpus of the property, if the income is not sufficient
to pay the same. . . . It has been held that, although this
authority.of a receiver to incur indebtedness, in order to keep
the business a ' going concern' until the rights of the parties
are adjusted and a sale is effected, ordinarily arises only in
cases of railroad companies; yet the same rules may be applied in other cases under like circumstances."
The Court of Appeals had reached the same conclusion in
the similar case of Filkins v. Adams,' where it was said the receiver of a partnership ought not to be the sufferer if the court
erred in not surrendering a hotel to the lessor.
The Supreme Court, too,. had alreadydecided that a mine
could be operated to preserve leasehold interests from forfeiture; but "whether they should be kept on foot was a
problem of business economy as well as of law. The jurisdiction of the court in such a case must be largely discretionary." Continuing the business for such a purpose is by
no means unreasonable, we submit, for even a considerable
expense in approaching a vein of ore might well cost less in
the end than the forfeiture of the lease. In fact, it is such a
case as was suggested by Judge Paul in Fidelity Ins., Tr. &
S. D. Co. v. Roanoke Iron Co.'
Another hotel case was very vigorously contested in Alabama.4 A receiver was appointed at the suit of the lessor to
"conduct and operate the hotel," but the court made no order
entitling him to raise money for the purpose. This, it was
held, empowered him to purchase on credit, and all his debts,
incurred in good faith, were ordered paid. "To prevent irreparable damage and loss, sometimes it is necessary to make
provision, in cases of a going business, that the business be
continued

....

The party contracting with the receiver looks

I 6o IMI. App. 4io (i8g).
2Wilmington Star Mining Co. v. Allen, 95 M. 288 (x88o).
2 68 Fed. 623 (1895) ; see page 281, sup ra.
' Thornton v. Highland Ave. & Belt 1. R. Co., 94 Ala. 353 (i89i); o5
Ala. 224 (1894).
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to the rem, the fund or property in gremio legis, backed by a
pledge of the court that it shall be liable for all costs and expenses legitimately incurred in pursuance of its order anddecrees.

.

.

.

If there is an income from the property, the

current expenses should be first paid out of this; but, this
failing, there is no doubt that the corpus may be applied to
such necessary expenses

....

Under such conditions the

court should never surrender its custody of the property, or
discharge the receiver, until all obligations incurred.by him in
the proper discharge of his duties have been adjusted and
provided for."' The opinion from which we quote was expressly approved when the case came a second time before the
court,2 and the law may be considered well settled in that
state.3 The authorities chiefly relied on, it should be observed, were railroad cases in the Federal courts. Yet this
same court, twenty years before, had spoken very differently
of the foreclosure of a railroad mortgage. "We are not
aware," it was said, in a most elaborate opinion, "of any
principle of law or element of wise policy which would justify
such a court (of equity), after so getting possession, in laying
aside its judicial character and engaging, however hopeful the
scheme, in the completion of unfinished undertakings and in
raising money for this purpose, as the parties themselves could
not, namely, by setting up liens which shall displace other and
older liens, without the consent of the persons to whom they
belong."'
But it should not be overlooked that the court's intention
in the hotel case' was to preserve the good-will of a going
concern as an asset for the creditors. When a receiver was
applied for, merely to stave off creditors and earn an income
from mines and stores wherewith to pay the debts after an indefinite time, the court refused the appointment quite as positively as a Federal court might have done.6
1 94 Ala.

353 (1891).

Ala. 224 (1894).
3 Cf. Beckwith v. Carroll, 56 Ala. 12 (1876).
Meyers v. Johnston. 53 Ala. 237, 338 (1875).
5 Thornton v. Highland Ave. & Belt R. P. Co., 94 Ala. 353 (1891) ; 105
Ala. 224 (1894), supra.
'Little Warrior Coal Co., 17 So. ziS (1895); Etowah Mining Co. v.
Wills Valley M. & M. Co., x7 So. (Ala.) 522 (1895).
2 2o5
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The decisions in Virginia and Texas might, perhaps, be explained as resting on special facts, yet the opinions assert
broadly a right to charge the corpus of the estate
In Karn
v. R rer Iron Co.,1 the corporation's mines and furnaces were
connected by a railroad, built apparently for the company's
own use, and a bridge in this road was washed out. The
receiver was authorized to borrow money on certificates to
rebuild this bridge and make other repairs to put the property in saleable condition; he was directed also to operate
the furnace. These certificates were given a lien prior to
the mortgage bonds, although it would seem the property
might well have been sold and the repairs and the rebuilding
of the bridge left to the purchaser to undertake. Common
experience shows only too often that such extensive repairs
do not always enhance the. value of a property to the extent
of their cost, so the course pursued was likely to result in increased loss to the bondholders.
In reliance, no doubt, upon this case, a receiver was appointed for a coal company and instructed to complete its
coke ovens. He was then directed to operate the plant for a
year, to ascertain if the venture were profitable. His working
capital was provided by an issue of receiver's certificates, to
which the court gave a paramount lien. Fortunatelylfor the
other lien creditors, they had no notice of the application for
these certificates. The original liens were, therefore, reinstated
by the Supreme Court,2 after the operation had resulted in a
lcss and the sale of the property did not meet the debts.
But the power to issue such certificates in a proper case was
again asserted-a power to be "exercised with the utmost
caution, prudence and reserve," and always with notice to the
parties in interest.
In the Texas case, E!is v. Water Co.,3 the receiver was directed to keep the water works in operation as a going concern
for the supply of a city. The receivership was at the suit
of a general unsecured creditor, and the certificates, expenses
186 Va. 754 (i8go).
2 Osborne v. Big Stone Gap Colliery Co., 30 S. E. (Va.) 446 (1896).
386 Tex. o9; 23 S. '%V.858 (1893).
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of administration and costs of the proceedings were charged in
part on the fund in preference to existing liens. This was
justified as follows:
"While we have no doubt that the power to authorize a receiver appointed by a court of equity to create debts is liable
to a great abuse, and are of the opinion that in every cage it
should be exercised, if at all, with extreme caution; we know
of no rule or principle that would restrict the power to railway
companies.only.... The authority granted to receivers in
railway cases to create debts and to make them a charge upon
the corjpss of the property of the company, is usually justified
upon this ground (i.
e., the public duty imposed); and yet it
seems that there may be grave doubt whether it affords a
solid foundation for the doctrine. It is not clearly seen that
the courts have the power to appropriate any'part of the
property subject to a mortgage in the interest of the public,
or to impair the mortgagee's security and the obligation of
their contract, in order to discharge a duty the mortgagor
owes to the public. But when a court has taken the control
of property from its owners and has placed it in the hands of
its receiver, it is its duty so to direct its management as to
preserve its value for the benefit of all parties at interest.
This may be best accomplished by a continuation of the business, although such continued operation may involve the
danger of some loss. .

.

. If the creditors of the receiver

could only look to such (i. e., current) revenue for the satisfaction of their claims, he would be unable to obtain credit,
and the operation of the works would be impracticable. Accordingly the rule is, that the expense of administering and
preserving the property is to be charged, first.upon the net income, and if that be not sufficient, then upon the property
itself or its proceeds upon sale. Now, while the circumstances
which justify the appointment of a receiver, without authority
to incur indebteness in order to keep the property and business 'a going concern' until the rights of all parties can be adjusted and a sale effected, had not ordinarily arisen except in
cases of railroad companies, no reason is seen why the same
rules should not apply in other cases under like circumstances

OF A BUSINESS CORPORATION.

.

. . If the public have an interest in the continued operation

of a railroad, so have they in that of water works constructed
for the purpose of supplying water to the inhabitants of a city.
So, also, if the property of a water company be placed in the
hands of a receiver, it may be best preserved by continuing the
operation of its works so as to maintain it a going concern."
We shall call attention, however, to the fact that the court's
authorities do not all sustain this proposition. Nearly all of
them arose out of railroad receiverships, and the Pennsylvania
case of Neali's Appeal' is mis-stated. It is true the receiver
of a shipbuilding concern was in that case authorized to issue
certificates to enable him to complete certain vessels, and that
these certificates were paid out of the fund; but the preference
thus given was only over unsecured general creditors and not
over creditors with vested liens.
This is the strongest assertion the writer has found of the
authority to charge the corpus of the property with debts incurred by the receiver in operating it. It is based on both
grounds-the public need, existing in this particular case, and
the general right of a court in administering the affairs of an
insolvent private corporation. There was also a local statute
covering the case. No attempt is made to meet the argument used in so many cases supporting the opposite view,
that while it may be better for the unsecured creditors, or even
for those with junior liens, to carry on the business, the creditors with superior liens have vested rights not to be disturbed
without their consent Such rights were thus disturbed in
railroad receiverships, but only after a long struggle and many
dissenting opinions was the rule finally established. Even in
such a case, a creditor asking. no favors need grant none--a
distinction the Texas court seems to have overlooked.
The conclusion to be drawn from the cases appears to be
that, from the point of view of strict right, a court cannot authorize the continuance, by a receiver, of a private business at
the expense of those holding vested liens. At times, however, there are considerations of public interest involved, and
' 22 W.N. C. 31 (1888).
2

Kneeland v. American Loan &Tr. Co., 136 U. S. 89 (189o).
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it may be that in some special instances these will prevail, as
they have done in the case of railroads. Thus far they have
been given effect only in a very few of the State courts. The
Supreme Court of the United States has yet to pass upon the
question, but the other Federal courts and the State courts
whose decisions are most entitled to weight have pronounced
emphatically against any interference with vested liefis, by continuing the business of a private corporation after a receiver
has been appointed.
Erskine Hazard.Dckson.

